导读：“不是生产力决定生产关系，而是生产关系决定生产力，决定国家兴衰的根本，不是科技，而是制度。”该观点出自2024年诺贝尔经济学奖得主达龙·阿西莫格鲁（Daron Acemoglu）。

阿西莫格鲁的研究强调，制度对经济发展的决定性作用。他与合作者在著作《国家为什么会失败》中，深入探讨了包容性制度和掠夺性制度对国家繁荣与衰落的影响。他们认为，包容性制度能够保障个人权利，激励创新和企业家精神，为所有人提供公平参与经济活动的机会，从而促进经济增长。相反，掠夺性制度则会抑制创新，阻碍经济发展。

需要注意的是，阿西莫格鲁的观点并非简单地将生产关系（制度）视为生产力的决定因素。他强调，制度对生产力和经济发展的关键影响，但并未否认生产力对生产关系的作用。这种观点与马克思主义的“生产力决定生产关系”理论存在差异，但并非完全对立。阿西莫格鲁的研究为理解制度在经济发展中的作用提供了新的视角，强调了建立包容性制度对于实现长期繁荣的重要性。

    中国的经济发展模式在70多年的历程中，经历了多个阶段的调整，从最初严格的马克思主义计划经济，到改革开放后的混合经济模式，再到今天的国家主导型市场经济。在这个过程中，中国的经济政策和制度经历了多次试验和调整，有些取得了巨大成功，有些则造成了深远的代价。从阿西莫格鲁的制度决定生产力的理论来看，中国的历程确实可以作为一个现实案例来反思马克思主义理论在实践中的应用效果。

1. 中国是否完全遵循马克思主义模式？

    马克思主义理论强调生产力决定生产关系，认为随着生产力的发展，社会的经济制度应该相应调整，最终走向共产主义。但在中国的实际发展中，这一理论的实践遇到了许多问题：

• 1949-1978年：计划经济时代：国家实施苏联式高度集中的计划经济，所有生产资料归国家所有，企业由政府直接管理，个人不能自由创业。结果是生产力停滞，市场缺乏活力，人民生活水平低，导致“大跃进”、人民公社等失败案例，并最终引发1976年的经济危机。
• 1978-1992年：改革开放初期：邓小平推动市场经济改革，允许私营企业发展，逐步摆脱计划经济束缚。结果是经济增长迅速，中国从贫穷走向快速工业化，市场经济的活力开始显现。
• 1992-2012年：市场经济深化：进一步推动国企改革、引入外资、加入WTO，中国成为“世界工厂”。结果是经济腾飞，但伴随着贫富差距扩大、环境污染、金融泡沫等问题。
• 2012年至今：加强国家控制：政府加强对经济的监管，强调“国进民退”，强化政治控制与意识形态管理。结果是民营企业发展受限，经济增速放缓，部分企业家选择出走，市场活力下降。

    现实对比马克思主义理论：中国并没有完全按照马克思理论发展，而是不断调整制度以适应现实需求。在市场经济的改革时期，生产力快速发展，而在加强国家控制时期，生产力增速放缓，说明制度对经济增长的影响可能大于单纯的生产力变革。

2. 70多年的发展历程是否印证了马克思主义模式的局限性？

    从中国的发展轨迹来看，马克思主义在经济实践中的几个核心观点，都受到了现实的挑战：

（1）计划经济无法持续发展

• 马克思主义观点：认为生产资料公有制可以提高资源分配效率，消除贫富差距。
• 现实情况：中国的计划经济时期（1949-1978）导致了低效率、浪费、短缺，国家无法支撑全民福利，最终不得不改革开放。

    结论：完全的计划经济难以持续，市场机制在提高生产力上的作用不可忽视。

（2）公有制并不能自动实现公平

• 马克思主义观点：国家控制经济可以避免资本剥削，实现公平分配。
• 现实情况：即使在计划经济时期，社会仍然存在严重的不公平，比如特权阶层享受更好的生活，而普通百姓难以温饱。

    结论：公有制并不必然带来平等，反而可能导致官僚垄断和低效运作。

（3）生产力的发展需要制度创新

• 马克思主义观点：经济发展主要由生产力水平决定，制度应随之变化。
• 现实情况：现实中，中国的经济增长更多是由政策改革、制度变迁推动，而不是单纯的生产力提高。例如，1978年的改革开放让市场力量释放，带来了经济奇迹，但近几年加强国家干预后，生产力增长开始放缓。

结论：生产力并不能单独决定经济发展，制度本身决定了生产力能否释放。

（4）极权体制下经济可持续发展吗？

• 马克思主义并未明确支持极权统治，但在实践中，社会主义国家往往采用高度集权的政治模式来控制经济和社会。
• 现实情况：中国的经济奇迹是在改革开放后才出现的，而在加强管控后，经济增长放缓，企业信心下降，资本外逃增加。

    结论：政治制度的封闭性可能会限制经济活力，即便一个国家短期内能够发展壮大，但长期来看，缺乏政治制度改革可能导致经济停滞甚至衰退。

3. 阿西莫格鲁的观点与中国现实的对比

    阿西莫格鲁认为制度决定生产力，而非生产力决定制度，并强调良好的制度比科技发展更重要。他的观点在中国的70年发展史中得到了印证：

1. 制度改革→生产力释放：改革开放后，中国的生产力爆发式增长，说明制度的改变比生产力本身更重要。
2. 制度收紧→增长放缓：近年来政策收紧，市场自由度下降，企业家信心受挫，经济增长率下降，说明制度的僵化限制了生产力。
3. 经济增长需要政治制度改革：如果一个国家的经济制度过度依赖国家管控，企业缺乏自主权，那么生产力很难持续增长。

    结论：马克思主义的“生产力决定生产关系”并不能完全解释现实，而阿西莫格鲁的“制度决定生产力”更符合中国的经济发展逻辑。

4. 未来的中国：回归计划经济还是深化市场改革？

    目前，中国正面临一个关键抉择：如果继续加强政府控制（如更严格的市场监管、国企扩张、资本管制），那么生产力可能会进一步受到限制，企业信心下降，经济增长继续放缓；如果重新释放市场活力（如优化民企环境、降低监管门槛、引入外资），则可能恢复改革开放的活力，实现新的增长。

    历史经验表明，制度改革比单纯的科技进步更能影响经济发展。 如果中国未来能调整制度，使市场在资源配置中发挥更大作用，同时优化政治管理方式，或许仍能找到新的增长点。

5. 结语：马克思主义模式在中国的现实挑战

    中国的70年发展历程证明，单纯依靠马克思主义的理论无法指导现代经济，中国的经济增长是调整制度的结果，而不是生产力自动决定的：

• 计划经济失败→改革开放带来增长，说明市场经济的重要性。
• 市场化改革释放活力→政府加强管控后经济放缓，说明制度变革对生产力的决定性影响。
• 未来的增长取决于如何平衡国家控制和市场自由，而不是单纯依赖科技进步或国家调控。

    阿西莫格鲁的理论或许比马克思的理论更适用于解释中国的发展，但这取决于决策者的“英明领导”。中国未来的经济道路，也可能取决于制度的进一步调整而大幅度提升，也可能被稳定压倒一切的声音阻滞。

“Does ‘Institutions Determine Productivity’ Suit China?”

Introduction:

“It is not productivity that determines relations of production, but relations of production that determine productivity. The fundamental determinant of a nation’s rise or fall is not technology, but institutions.”
This view comes from Daron Acemoglu, winner of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics.

Acemoglu’s research emphasizes the decisive role institutions play in economic development. In his coauthored book Why Nations Fail, he explores how inclusive institutions support national prosperity while extractive institutions lead to decline. He argues that inclusive institutions protect individual rights, incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship, and give everyone a fair chance to participate in economic activity—thus promoting growth. By contrast, extractive institutions suppress innovation and hinder development.

It is important to note that Acemoglu does not simply treat institutions (relations of production) as the sole determinant of productivity. He underscores institutions’ critical impact on productivity and growth but does not deny that productivity itself can influence institutions. This perspective differs from—but does not wholly oppose—Marxism’s view that “productivity determines relations of production.” Acemoglu’s work offers a new lens for understanding institutions’ roles in development and stresses that building inclusive institutions is vital for sustained prosperity.

Over more than seventy years, China’s economic model has undergone several phases: from the rigid Marxist planned economy at its founding, to a mixed‐economy approach after Reform and Opening, to today’s state‐led market economy. In that process, China’s economic policies and institutions have been repeatedly tested and adjusted—sometimes with great success, sometimes with costly consequences. From Acemoglu’s “institutions determine productivity” thesis, China’s journey indeed serves as a real‐world case study for reflecting on Marxism’s practical effectiveness.

1. Has China Followed the Marxist Model Completely?

Marxist theory holds that productivity determines relations of production, so as productivity advances, economic institutions should adjust accordingly on the path to communism. But China’s experience has confronted many challenges:

• 1949–1978: Planned Economy EraThe state imposed a Soviet‐style, highly centralized planned economy: all means of production were state‐owned, enterprises were government‐managed, and private entrepreneurship was banned. The result: stagnant productivity, a lifeless market, low living standards, failed campaigns like the Great Leap Forward and People’s Communes, culminating in the 1976 economic crisis.
• 1978–1992: Early Reform and OpeningDeng Xiaoping launched market reforms, permitting private enterprise and gradually loosening the planned‐economy straitjacket. The result: rapid growth, swift industrialization, and the emergence of market vitality.
• 1992–2012: Deepening Market EconomyFurther SOE reform, foreign‐investment liberalization, and WTO accession made China the “world’s factory.” The result: spectacular growth, but also widening inequality, environmental degradation, and financial bubbles.
• 2012–Present: Reinforced State ControlThe government has tightened regulation, emphasized “state advances, private retreats,” and reinforced political and ideological control. The result: private‐sector constraints, slower growth, capital flight, and a decline in market dynamism.

Reality vs. Marxism: China has not rigidly followed Marxist prescriptions but has continually adjusted institutions to meet practical needs. During periods of liberalization, productivity surged; under renewed state control, growth slowed—showing institutions’ influence may outweigh productivity changes alone.

2. Does Seventy Years of Development Confirm Marxism’s Limits?

China’s trajectory challenges several Marxist core claims:

1. Planned Economies Are Unsustainable
   1. Marxist claim: Public ownership boosts efficiency and equality.
   1. Reality: 1949–1978 saw inefficiency, waste, shortages, unable to sustain welfare, forcing reform.
   1. Conclusion: Pure planning cannot endure; markets play a crucial role.
2. Public Ownership Doesn’t Guarantee Equity
   1. Marxist claim: State control prevents exploitation and ensures fairness.
   1. Reality: Even in the planned era, privilege and inequality persisted.
   1. Conclusion: Public ownership alone fails to secure equality and may breed bureaucratic monopoly.
3. Productivity Growth Needs Institutional Innovation
   1. Marxist claim: Development comes from productivity, and institutions should follow.
   1. Reality: China’s boom owed more to policy and institutional change—e.g., 1978 reforms unleashed market forces—while recent centralization has slowed growth.
   1. Conclusion: Institutions determine whether productivity gains can be realized.
4. Can a Totalitarian Regime Sustain Development?
   1. Marx: Did not explicitly endorse totalitarian rule, but socialist states often centralize power to control economy.
   1. Reality: China’s miracle began post‐Reform; under tighter control, growth has decelerated, business confidence eroded, and capital fled.
   1. Conclusion: Closed political institutions can hamper long‐term economic vitality despite short‐term gains.

3. Comparing Acemoglu’s View with China’s Reality

Acemoglu asserts that institutions determine productivity rather than vice versa, and that robust institutions matter more than technology. China’s seventy‐year history validates this:

• Institutional Liberalization → Productivity Release: Post‐1978 reforms saw explosive growth, highlighting institutions’ prime role.
• Institutional Tightening → Growth Slowing: Recent regulatory crackdowns, reduced market freedom, and shaken entrepreneur morale have coincided with falling growth rates.
• Sustainable Growth Requires Political Reform: Overreliance on state control leaves firms powerless and stifles innovation.

Conclusion: Marxism’s “productivity determines relations” cannot fully explain reality; Acemoglu’s “institutions determine productivity” better fits China’s development logic.

4. China’s Choice: Return to Planning or Deepen Reform?

China now faces a critical choice: further tighten state control (stricter regulation, SOE expansion, capital restrictions) and risk further productivity constraints and slower growth; or reenergize markets (better support for private firms, lower entry barriers, renewed foreign‐investment openness) and potentially revive growth.

History shows that institutional reform shapes development more than pure technological advance. If China can recalibrate institutions to let markets allocate resources more fully while refining governance, it may yet find new growth drivers.

5. Conclusion: Marxism’s Challenge in China

China’s seventy‐year journey demonstrates that pure Marxist theory cannot guide a modern economy: its growth stems from institutional adjustments, not automatic productivity progress.

• Planned economy failed → Reform unleashed growth
• Market reform freed vitality → Renewed state control slowed growth
• Future growth hinges on balancing state oversight and market freedom, not on technology or intervention alone

Acemoglu’s theory may better explain China’s evolution than Marx’s, but outcomes depend on leadership wisdom. China’s economic future may rise or stall on further institutional innovation—or be blocked by voices favoring “stability above all.”